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Title: Performance of private equity-owned firms post-IPO 
Author: Marcus Carl Axel Lindberg 
This paper examines the effect of private equity involvement in initial public offerings. Two 
regression models were applied to assess the data ranging from 2006 and 2017 with IPOs on 
Nasdaq Stockholm. The dataset includes 126 firms out of which 33 were private equity-
sponsored. 
The first regression model predicts next year’s return on assets with financials from the year 
prior to, and the year of the IPO. The second regression is using cumulative abnormal returns 
as dependent variable. Cumulative abnormal returns are computed for four different time 
windows following the event of the IPO, in order to measure the effect private equity firms 
have on companies they are backing in the event of an IPO.  
t can be concluded that private equity firms have a positive impact through their involvement, 
both in terms of return on assets and cumulative abnormal returns. However, the positive effect 
on cumulative abnormal returns can only be validated for the three-month period following the 
initial public offering. 
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Título: Desempenho de IPOs financiados com capital privado 
Autor: Marcus Carl Axel Lindberg  
Este artigo examina o efeito do envolvimento de capital privado em ofertas públicas iniciais. 
Dois modelos de regressão foram aplicados para avaliar os dados que variam de 2006 e 2017 
com IPOs na Nasdaq Estocolmo. O conjunto de dados inclui 126 empresas, das quais 33 foram 
patrocinadas por capital privado. 
O primeiro modelo de regressão prevê o retorno do ano que vem sobre ativos com informações 
financeiras do ano anterior ao ano do IPO. A segunda regressão está usando retornos anormais 
cumulativos como variável dependente. Os retornos anormais acumulados são calculados por 
quatro janelas de tempo diferentes após o evento do IPO, a fim de medir o efeito que as 
empresas de private equity têm nas empresas que estão apoiando no caso de um IPO. 
Pode-se concluir que as empresas de private equity têm um impacto positivo por meio de seu 
envolvimento, tanto em termos de retorno sobre ativos quanto em retornos anormais 
cumulativos. No entanto, o efeito positivo nos retornos anormais cumulativos só pode ser 
validado pelo período de três meses após a oferta pública inicial. 
Palavras-chave: Nasdaq Stockholm, capital privado, private equity, oferta pública inicial, 
















AMEX  American Stock Exchange 
BHARs  Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns   
CAARs  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Capex  Capital Expenditure 
CAPM  Capital Asset Pricing Model 
D/E  Debt-to-Equity 
EBITDA  Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
EV  Enterprise Value 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
IPO  Initial Public Offering 
LBO  Leveraged Buyout 
M&A  Mergers and Acquisitions 
NYSE  New York Stock Exchange 
OMX30S  OMX 30 Stockholm 
P/B  Price-to-Book Value 
P/E  Price/Earnings Ratio 
P&L  Profit and Loss Statement 
PE  Private Equity 
PPE  Property, Plant and Equipment 
RLBO  Reversed Leveraged Buyout 
ROA  Return on Assets 
ROE  Return on Equity 
SEO  Seasoned Equity Offerings 
SMEs  Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
VC  Venture Capital 





Table of contents 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................1 
1.1 Problem statement .........................................................................................................2 
2. Literature review ................................................................................................................3 
3. Data .................................................................................................................................. 10 
3.1 Data collection ............................................................................................................ 10 
3.2 Sample ........................................................................................................................ 12 
3.3 Data limitations ........................................................................................................... 13 
4. Methodology .................................................................................................................... 14 
4.1 Regression models ...................................................................................................... 14 
4.2 Dependent variable...................................................................................................... 14 
4.3 Independent variables .................................................................................................. 16 
5. Descriptive statistics ......................................................................................................... 18 
6. Results .............................................................................................................................. 22 
7. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 28 
7.1 Further research .......................................................................................................... 29 
8. References ........................................................................................................................ 31 



















Through a continuous development of technology and increased globalization, the world and 
the financial markets get increasingly intertwined. This enables investments in both new and 
previously not as easily accessible investment opportunities in numerous asset classes. Today, 
information is much more easily available and more people invest in the stock market. 
Therefore, it is natural that investment strategies are developed around a vast amount of 
potential investment opportunities, since it is of investors’ best interest. In addition, researchers 
conduct studies around all different markets, financial instruments and events that sparks the 
interest. 
With regards to the reasons earlier mentioned, it comes as no surprise that initial public 
offerings are a much studied subject. There are several studies that address the IPO underpricing 
and poor performance, in terms of stock returns, of companies post IPO. The general notion 
from previous research seems to be that firms which display positive returns during their first 
day going public, to show underperformance from thereon, in the long run going forward. 
Private equity (PE) funds usually acquire companies through leveraged buyouts, which is 
described as majority stake investments in private companies with a considerable portion of 
debt, where the firm later is enhanced through active ownership and capital injections via 
efficient financing. Since the inception in the United States during the 1980s, the overall 
attractiveness of private equity as an asset class has altered during business cycles. Today, it 
seems more popular than ever. 
A much pursued strategy for selling (exiting) investments made in portfolio companies by 
private equity funds, is by listing it on an exchange through an initial public offering (IPO), and 
divesting the shares to the public. Private equity funds are known for creating large returns on 
investments, and some believe they are not creating any real value. 
Therefore, the performance of IPOs where a PE fund is backing the target subject of going 
public has received attention in media, especially in the United States and in the United 
Kingdom. These two markets are at the forefront for the asset class of private equity 
investments, and are considered as developed. Sweden, in spite of not being as large with 
regards to the size of the economy, is also surprisingly established and has many actors active 
in both traditional private equity- and venture capital investments. Reasons for this is believed 
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to be the robust legal system, a high degree of education through free access, and the history of 
entrepreneurial spirit which has created several multinational corporations.   
However, the Swedish debate regarding these type of funds is more on a political scale where 
the most left-wing party want to prohibit PE funds to have ownership stake in businesses 
operating within the welfare sector. This serves as proof of the topic’s immediacy outside the 
realm of academia.  
1.1 Problem statement 
Several studies have been conducted around both performance of initial public offerings, and 
initial public offerings where the company being listed is wholly or partially owned by PE 
funds. However, this research is more extensive for larger economies. 
For Swedish companies going through the process of an IPO, the amount of research is fairly 
scarce. Therefore, this study strives to fill a gap in the existing literature by contributing with 
observations from the Swedish financial market, more specifically Nasdaq Stockholm. 
In order to address the topic this study will focus on; 
I. What are the difference between private equity-sponsored and non-sponsored firms that 
went through an IPO, in terms of return on assets? 
II. How do the stock price returns deviate between these two groups of firms during the 
period following the initial public offering, in terms of cumulative abnormal returns? 
For the models chosen this translates to that there should be evidence of differences between 











2. Literature review 
Funds specialized in acquiring companies with small amounts of equity and substantially larger 
part of external debt in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) are commonly referred to as private equity 
(PE) firms, as described by Kaplan & Stromberg (2009). In a traditional LBO transaction, the 
private equity fund acquires a majority stake in mature, private companies with seasoned 
management teams and stable cash flows. These firms are enhanced through active ownership 
and effective financing during the fund’s lifecycle, with ownership that usually lasts five to 
seven years. The phenomenon of LBOs and private equity firms first appeared in United States 
during the 80’s, and has since then increased in attractiveness as an asset class. For instance, 
when looking at the Global PE capital raised (in $1,000 billions), the amount totaled to $105 in 
year 2003. This figure grew each year until the 2008’s financial crisis, where it dipped 
significantly. In 2015 it surpassed the previous record levels of 2008, and peaked in 2017 with 
$855. Buyout funds constitute the lion’s share of the global PE capital raised between 2003 and 
2018, Bain & Company (2019). 
In spite of Sweden not being a large economy, the private equity market is remarkably 
developed. Private equity helps small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to reach their full 
potential and can provide better access to capital markets. Moreover, empirical studies show 
that companies backed by Swedish private equity firms display a relatively higher profitability 
and productivity post-acquisition, than similar firms without PE-backing. Between 2007 and 
2017, the funding provided by PE-funds added up to fifteen billion euros, which roughly is 
equivalent to the amount IPO capital issued by Nasdaq Stockholm in the same time period. 
These companies were responsible for 270,000 job opportunities and 5.5% of the Swedish gross 
domestic product (GDP), SVCA (2017). 
IPOs are a sought way to exit investments made by PE firms. The rational for exiting a firm 
through an IPO is simply due to the returns being abnormal when compared to other options, 
Das, Jagannathan & Sarin (2002). High valuations have further fueled the interest of IPOs in 
general, and PE-backed IPOs in particular. This is interesting from a larger perspective outside 
the academic sphere, because of the debate in Sweden around performance of IPOs, and 
whether or not PE-firms should be able operate in industries which otherwise rely on 
governmental funding, such as elderly care, healthcare and education. This paper could 
highlight the reality on company fundamentals and financial performance for different 
companies that go public, while there is evidence that PE-firms contribute to stimulating the 
economy and the creation of jobs. 
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There is a handful of existing literature that investigates IPO pricing and the aftermarket 
performance of companies after being listed. Jain & Kini (1994) study the operating 
performance of IPO firms, measured by operating return on assets and operating cash flows 
scaled by the firm’s assets, in comparison to the levels seen before the IPO. The authors show 
that firms that go public, in general, demonstrate a reduction in operating performance, after 
the event of an IPO. The trade-off for lower operating performance, is an increase in sales and 
capex in the post-IPO period, relative to firms in the same industry, which are public. Another 
finding, is that the firms where a higher ownership stake is kept by the entrepreneur post-IPO, 
tend to perform better in comparison to other issuing firms, in general. The authors do not find 
any connection between the initial returns of the initial public offering and post-IPO operating 
performance. Moreover, the authors believe it is contradictory how firms that go public usually 
are priced at high price/earnings (P/E) ratios. This translates to a belief among investors that 
there will be an increased future growth of the company. Moreover, the authors find empirical 
evidence that profit margins before the IPO, which serves as the foundation for the future 
expectations, are not upheld. To explain why IPO firms’ operational performance decline post-
issue, one could point to increased agency costs when going public. This would be a result of 
reduced ownership from the initial owners post-IPO, as the conflict of interest increases with a 
higher amount of shareholders. 
Another explanation for the reduced operating performance could be “altering” the financial 
numbers prior to the IPO to the point where those levels could be kept later on. This would be 
done in order to achieve a successful IPO, by increasing the money raised from the operation. 
As a result, the performance post-IPO will, of course not, live up to the initially set of 
expectations. Lastly, there could be a timing aspect, in which entrepreneurs would time their 
IPO to certain periods with particularly strong financials. The common denominator for all 
these possible reasons are information asymmetry and conflict of interest. 
Brav & Gompers (1997) study long-term performance of IPOs between 1972 and 1992. The 
sample contains both venture-backed and non-venture-backed firms that went public. The 
authors examine the performance of these newly listed firms on a five-year period, post-IPO. 
They find that firms who are backed by VC-companies outperforms their non-VC-backed 
counterparts, when looking at equally weighted returns. The authors test the performance of 
IPO firms with several different benchmarks, market indexes (S&P 500, Nasdaq composite, 
NYSE/AMEX value-weighted, NYSE/AMEX equal-weighted), industry portfolios, Fama-
French three factor model and portfolios matched by book-to-market and size.  Measuring the 
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performance of IPO firms, the results show that what drives poor performance among the non-
VC-backed issuers is its small size, in terms of market capitalization. Moreover, when looking 
at the value weighted returns the poor performance is reduced in comparison to the benchmark 
indexes. Lastly, there is evidence of correlation in underperformance and time of the year, 
regardless of which year the firm goes public. To conclude, the found underperformance does 
not solely seem to be a result of the IPO, as firms do not underperform when matched in terms 
of size, book-to-market ratio and companies that have issued equity in recent time are excluded. 
One possible justification for the phenomenon of underperformance could be that investors tend 
to methodically overestimate the possible future growth prospects of the IPO firm. Also 
asymmetric information may have an effect due to institutional investors being more informed 
than small shareholders, and more actively monitoring their portfolio holdings. 
Ritter (1991) investigates underpricing of IPOs that took place between 1975 and 1984, and 
their aftermarket performance for a three-year period. When looking at the returns of the first 
trading day (opening price compared to closing price of the initial day of trading) the author 
refers to a previous work of by Ibbotson, Sindelar & Ritter (1988) which studied a sample of 
8,668 IPOs that were listed between 1960 and 1987 in the United States. These firms display 
an average return of 16.4%. Moreover, there are certain periods where the returns of the first 
trading day are even more notable. However, the aftermarket long-term (three-year) 
performance is not as promising, as the IPO firms performed substantially worse than a group 
of comparable firms, matched by industry and size. IPOs are of interest for several reasons. 
First, to investigate the performance of IPOs is the investor’s best interest: identifying different 
patterns an investor can be able to develop strategies for trading and generate abnormal returns. 
Secondly, aftermarket performance of IPOs can provide evidence of different hypotheses, e.g. 
Shiller (1990), who states that equity markets with specific emphasis on the market for IPOs 
are sensitive to current trends which can affect market prices to a certain extent. 
Ritter (2018) measures the performance for different IPO groups. The sample contains IPOs 
between 1980 and 2016. The first day returns for IPOs of VC-backed firms were on average 
26.8%, while their non-VC and non-buyout counterparts yielded an average return of 13.5%. 
Moreover, when comparing the groups using a three-year buy-and-hold strategy, the VC-
backed IPOs had a return of 24.7%, while the non-financially sponsored group showed a return 
of 16.6%. When doing the same exercise with the distinction of making the returns market-
adjusted, both groups instead showed returns of -10.9% and -29.7%, respectively. 
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Levis (2011) conducted a study, that examined initial returns as well as the aftermarket 
performance for private equity- and VC-sponsored IPOs. The underlying data used is quite 
recent in comparison to many other studies, ranging from 1992-2005. However, the study 
examines issues on the London Stock Exchange. Since there is evidence of superior 
performance of PE-backed IPOs during recent years, the interest has increased. For instance, 
Cao & Lerner (2009) study reversed leveraged buyouts (RLBO) i.e. firms that previously were 
acquired by a private equity fund and later exited through an IPO. The paper contains 526 
RLBOs from 1986 until 2003. Through cross-sectional analysis, the authors find that RLBOs 
continuously beats “regular” IPOs and the overall market. The typical RLBO is larger in size, 
and both more profitable and more heavily levered. However, the superior performance and 
number of RLBOs seems to be shrinking towards the end of the sample period. Another 
interesting conclusion from the authors is the existence of a weak correlation between high 
leverage post-IPO and poor performance. 
Levis discusses the two works of Jensen (1986, 1989), and argues that the recipe for successful 
PE investments includes the improvements in operational efficiencies, increased leverage, 
managerial proficiency and close monitoring. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that these 
value drivers are also in place when the firm is no longer in the PE fund’s possession. The PE 
player is accountable for structuring the terms of the IPO, and does not leave the company 
entirely when the firm goes public, as a result of regulation for lock-up period. Those could be 
reasons for IPOs being a suitable method for measuring the “PE-effect” on firm’s performance. 
In other literature the PE-effect is also referred to achieving goals by spurring management 
incentive programs, and if several individuals are heavily rewarded for achieving financial 
goals, it often happens. 
Furthermore, Levis (2011) aims to identify the central differences, in terms of firm 
characteristics, between PE-, VC- and non-backed initial public offerings. The author finds that 
there are notable differences among the different IPO groups. The differences are evident for 
the firms’ assets, market capitalization, debt levels, operational efficiency measures, and 
profitability, where all of these parameters are higher for the PE-group of IPOs. Meanwhile, the 
underpricing for the PE-group is lower at the point where the company is offered to the public, 
in comparison to the others. This is consistent with the fact that PE-funds target larger firms, 




To evaluate the performance in the aftermarket, Levis (2011) utilizes a three-year buy-and-hold 
strategy. For the PE-backed IPOs, the returns are statistically significant and positive during the 
sample period. Returns are measured as buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) compared to 
four different indexes; Financial Times All-Share Index, Size-Adjusted Index, FTSE10 Group 
Industry Classification and a size and book-to-market-adjusted benchmark. Meanwhile, the 
control groups VC- and non-sponsored IPOs perform worse or present negative returns. 
When looking at the returns from the first trading day post-IPO, the results are concordant with 
the theory that investors who commit to an IPO are the ones who are most hopeful for the firm’s 
future. VC- and non-sponsored IPOs displayed high initial returns during the first day of 
trading, and poor performance in the aftermarket. Loughran & Ritter (1995) studied IPOs from 
1970 until 1990 and found that both seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and IPOs have been 
deprived investments for investors, since it only yielded annual average returns between seven 
and five percent for SEOs and IPOs, respectively. Miller (1977) addresses investor behavior in 
terms different opinions regarding uncertainty and risk. The capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) assumes that all investors have the same distribution of the probability for all returns, 
as well as the same expected returns for all securities. However, the reality is a bit different. 
Investors’ opinions can diverge by some of them adding premiums for uncertainty when 
evaluating potential investment opportunities. Demand for different projects or investments 
comes from those with the most optimistic expectations. 
In conclusion, Levis (2011) made some additional findings. For instance, IPOs that were PE-
sponsored tend to focus around certain industries; typically, consumer goods and services. 
Moreover, these IPOs are noticeably more “accurately” priced, with less underpricing. Lastly, 
the PE-backed firms that went public in IPOs were not as sensitive for periods of “hot markets” 
when looking at the first-day returns. 
The long-run price development of the stocks that went public with PE-backing showed 
statistically significant and positive cumulative abnormal returns (CAARs), which would mean 
that these firms beat the benchmark performance measurement. In comparison, the other two 
groups of IPOs (VC and non-sponsored), appear to be performing poorly in the following three 
years in the aftermarket, after going public. How venture capital differs from more traditional 
private equity with leveraged buyouts, is the fact that private equity funds are typically larger 
than VC funds, in terms of capital. Private equity funds invest in a much later stage, where the 
target company is more mature and generates profit, and invests in fewer companies than VC 
funds. VC funds typically invests in startups. 
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Rosen (2006) conducts a study where the market’s reaction to an announced merger is 
examined. In order to determine whether the reaction of a bidding firm’s stock price is a result 
of the recent merger history, both in the overall market and for the bidding firm, an event study 
is used. To measure the effect of the announced merger, Rosen uses cumulative abnormal 
returns in the event window of five days surrounding the first announcement. Therefore, the 
two days prior to the merger announcement, the day of the announcement, and the two days 
post-announcement is used to create the event window. To compute the CAARs, Rosen adds 
the return of the stock for the bidding firm less the return of the index for each of the five days 
in the event window. In Rosen’s case, he uses a value-weighted index as benchmark for the 
“normal state” of the returns. However, Rosen stresses the importance of using an index with 
high correlation to the returns of the bidding firm, in the case that the firm had not announced 
a merger. 
To support this, Rosen (2006) refers to Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), who study patterns across 
more than 50 industries during the eighties. The authors show that “merger waves”, which is 
described as certain periods with peculiarly high M&A activity, is a result of shocks occurring 
in the different industries subsequent takeovers and restructuring. Stock price reactions 
following these shocks tend to have a spillover influence on the entire industry during merger 
waves. The authors are assuming these industry shocks and takeover activity to be linked, where 
the industries are structured by number of firms, as well as their size – which is determined by 
the technological development, governmental policies and supply and demand dynamics. Any 
factor that alters these fundamentals will cause a shift in the industry structure. 
Therefore, using an industry specific index as benchmark for the normal state of returns seems 
as the most superior choice. As a result, the factors affecting a certain industry will be captured 
more distinctively when looking at a specific firm’s performance in comparison to their peers.  
Rostami, Rostami & Kohansal (2016) study corporate governance effects on firms’ ROA and 
stock returns for companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange. Close to 470 firm years are 
gathered over a span of seven years to test the hypothesis. Mechanisms to measure corporate 
governance are, inter alia, concentration of ownership, involvement of institutional investors 
and independence of the board. The presented findings suggest that there is evidence of a 
positive effect on ROA from ownership concentration and independence of the board. Whereas 
institutional owner involvement on ROA. Meanwhile, institutional ownership affects stock 
returns positively. Moreover, the authors present previous similar work from other authors who 
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also uses different variations of return on assets as a measure of operating performance. 
























3.1 Data collection 
In order to be able to perform the statistical analysis regarding the performance of the different 
types of IPOs, a large exercise of data collection was done. First, all completed IPOs between 
2006-01-01 and 2017-12-31 on Nasdaq Stockholm, were gathered manually. The justification 
behind only taking the firms that were listed on Nasdaq Stockholm was the fact that it is the 
biggest and most prominent list, and the requirements on regulatory policies are higher, and 
therefore the data should be more complete. The reason for excluding all IPOs after the last day 
of 2017 was a result of the need for a complete fiscal year after the year of the IPO, and there 
is usually a delay before the complete financials of 2019 are presented. Data was required for 
three years in total, the year of the initial public offering as well as the two adjacent years. This 
was the case since one of the regressions uses a one-year lag on return on assets when predicting 
next year’s ROA based on the firm’s financials one year in advance. It is very uncommon for 
firms to be directly listed on Nasdaq Stockholm. Instead, they listed on a smaller exchange and 
later relisted when fulfilling the requirements of Nasdaq Stockholm, which is the most 
established list. Therefore, the selected firms had most of the data available for the required 
years around the event of the IPO. 
Second, Reuters Instrument Codes (RIC) were taken from Thomson Reuters Eikon. These 
codes serve as a type of ticker to identify stocks in Thomson Reuters Datastream. All stocks 
that were dual-listed were removed since it caused trouble when trying to retrieve the financial 
data. Moreover, a few companies that displayed error codes or completely missing data, were 
removed. 
Third, information about each IPO was collected, in order to find evidence of private equity 
firm involvement in the listing. This was expressed as a dummy variable taking the value 1 for 
PE-involvement (Private Equity involvement), and 0 for a “non-sponsored” IPOs. Private 
Equity involvement means that one or more Private Equity firms owned more than 50 of the 
firm subject for an initial public offering. 
Only the IPOs were private equity firms had majority interest were selected for the data sample. 
Three exceptions were made, were evidence of PE-involvement were found, but the exact 
ownership stake was not specified, or just is below controlling interest. However, there was 
strong reason to believe that the ownership of one or several PE firms had a strong impact on 
how the firm was developing up to the point of the IPO. One example could be where a VC 
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fund had over 40 percent ownership stake in the company, but it had been reduced over time 
through additional rounds of funding, and hence experiencing a dilutive effect. In addition to 
this, the date of the IPO, as in the first trading day were noted in order to be able to check the 
first day returns. 
For each firm, the following data items were retrieved on a yearly basis (see exceptions stated 
below); 
Net sales or revenues  – Worldscope (WC01001) 
Total assets  – Worldscope (WC02999) 
Long term debt  – Worldscope (WC03251) 
Short term debt & current portion of long term debt  – Worldscope (WC03051) 
Common equity – Worldscope (WC03501) 
Earnings before interest, taxes & depreciation  – Worldscope (WC18198) 
Cash  – Worldscope (WC02003) 
Net income after preferred dividends (Basic EPS) – Worldscope (WC01706) 
Common shares outstanding  – Datastream (WC05301) 
Enterprise value  – Worldscope (WC18100) 
Price (Adjusted – Default) – Datastream (P) (Daily values) 
Price – Opening – Datastream (PO) (Daily values) 
Price to book value – Datastream (PTBV) 
Current assets total – Worldscope (WC02201) 
Current liabilities total – Worldscope (WC03101) 
Capital expenditures (Additions to fixed assets) – Worldscope (WC04601) 
Property, plant and equipment net – Worldscope (WC02501) 
Return on assets – (Net income after preferred dividends / Total assets) 
Return on equity – (Net income after preferred dividends / Common equity) 
Working capital – (Current assets total – Current liabilities total) 
Debt-to-equity ratio – ((Long term debt + Short term debt) / Common equity)) 
In order to be able to compute the cumulative abnormal returns, benchmark indexes for each 
industry had to be retrieved. As previously discussed in the literature review, it is of great 
importance to choose a benchmark index with high correlation, in terms of market movements, 
to the changes in stock price of the firm active in the particular industry. 
12 
 
Since the data retrieved for the companies did not come with any system to identify in which 
industry the companies operated in, a number system based on two digits were created. Industry 
specific price indexes were taken from OMX Nasdaq Nordic. The table below presents the price 
index which was used as benchmark for the normal state of the returns within a certain industry, 
as well as which SIC code that corresponds to that industry; 
Table 1: Sector specific indexes used per industry 
Industry specific index   Industry   SIC 
Personal goods PI  Beauty/Health  11 
Basic resources PI  Commodities  12 
Software computer services PI  Data/IT  13 
OMX Stockholm PI  Education  14 
Alternative energy PI  Energy  15 
Retail PI  Fashion/Clothing  16 
Financial services PI  Finance  17 
Food and beverage PI  Food  18 
Industrials PI  Industrial  19 
Healthcare PI  Medical  20 
Real estate PI  Real estate  21 
Retail PI  Retail  22 
Consumer services PI  Services  23 
Telecom PI  Telecom  24 
Travel and leisure PI   Travel   25 
     
Note: The SIC codes are only made up in order to keep track of the 
industries while performing all the calculations. The SIC codes does 
not have any connection to any real industry identifying codes. In the 
table one can see the chosen benchmark index per industry used to 
compute the cumulative abnormal returns. 
 
3.2 Sample 
The final sample included a total of 126 companies that were listed on Nasdaq Stockholm 
between 2006-01-01 and 2017-12-31. Out of these 126 firms, 33 had PE involvement at the 
time of its IPO. In total the sample consisted of 378 firm-year observations; composed with 
data from the year of the IPO, as well as the year before and the year after. Out of the 33 IPOs 
with PE-involvement, only three could be classified as venture capital focused. The rest had a 
more traditional buyout focus. Because of the small number of VC-backed firms, no distinction 
between PE and VC will be made in this study. 
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3.3 Data limitations 
Limitations in the data made it impossible to use firms’ quarterly data and therefore instead 
yearly data was used. Even though Thomson Reuters Datastream supports the extraction of 
quarterly financial data for Swedish firms, all the values used correspond to the end of a given 
year. 
Moreover, firms that went public in 2018 could not be included in the sample. The reason was 
that I required two years around of the event of the IPO to be able to run the regression models. 
At the time of this study no data was yet available for the year of 2019. 
The price indexes selected as benchmarks for each industry are not perfect, due to lack of some 
industry specific indexes. For instance, in the case of “Education” the OMX Stockholm PI 
(OMXSPI) which is an “all-share index” was used, and it is constituted of all stocks listed on 
the Stockholm stock exchange. However, the vast majority of the sector indexes are a good fit 
for the industry they are representing in this study. Correlation between the returns of the firm 
and their corresponding benchmark index should be high. Further suggestions for research, 

















4.1 Regression models 
This paper serves two purposes. The models shown below will be applied to two different 
groups of IPO firms, in order to investigate the research questions. The first model will be used 
to assess the differences in terms of ROA between the two IPO groups. I will assess next year’s 
ROA based on sales, D/E ratio, ebitda and ppe. The second mode will test the effect firm 
characteristics such as sales, cash, capex and the operational efficiency measure ROE have on 
first-day, three-months, six-months and twelve-months abnormal returns in the two IPO groups. 
The following models will be applied:  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡+ 1 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 = 𝑓(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠, debt-to-equity ratio, ebitda, 𝑝𝑝𝑒, pe-sponsor 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑡+𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 = 𝑓(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠, 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦, pe-sponsor dummy) 
In order to run the regressions, the computer software Stata will be used. In this paper the panel 
data is weakly balanced, which means that there are not observations for each firm for all the 
years throughout the time period. This has to do with the nature of this exhibit which more 
resembles an event study, as it focuses on the effects resulting from a particular event. When 
performing these regressions, it is of importance to make sure the time-, and industry fixed 
effects are taken into consideration. By including the industry of time fixed effects, all average 
differences within the panel data groups, both unobservable and observable are being controlled 
for.  
When performing the second regression where cumulative abnormal returns is the dependent 
variable, it is not panel data, since each firm only have got one observations from one year, 
which is the year of the IPO. I will check the impact of being PE-sponsored in terms of 
cumulative abnormal returns post-IPO for four different time windows; first-day, three-months, 
six-months and twelve months CAARs.  
4.2 Dependent variable 
For the models, two different dependent variables will be used. The model which is trying to 
predicts next year’s return on assets aims at capturing the changes from the fiscal year before 
the IPO until the year of the IPO. This model serves to explain how firms are preparing 
themselves for an IPO, as well as to pinpoint differences between the two IPO groups. The first 
model with ROA as dependent variable, will highlight which financial items that have the most 
impact on ROA one year in advance, around the event of an IPO. This will give answers to 
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whether or not firms that are backed by a PE-fund and goes through an IPO are performing 
better or not, than their non-backed counterparts in terms of return on assets.  
Return on assets was chosen as the dependent variable since it is a substantial financial ratio. It 
presents the firm’s profitability. ROA seemed like the best way to predict how well a company 
was performing, if you only were to choose one dependent variable. In accordance with the 
work of Rostami, Rostamy & Kohansal (2016) and in union with the referencing these authors 
made to similar work, return on assets is widely accepted as a measurement of operating 
performance. For this regression, ROA has a lag of one year forward in time, in order to see if 
ROA can be predicted one year in advance based on previous year’s financial items and ratios. 
For the second regression, it is instead the cumulative abnormal returns that will be predicted. 
This will unravel which IPOs that, in theory, are favorable for investors to subscribe to in terms 
of returns during a specified window in excess of the return of the market, as in comparable 
benchmark index, for the same given period. This is relevant due to the vast amount of literature 
that discusses IPO underpricing and initial returns of IPO firms. 
Daily values of the benchmark indexes presented in the data chapter were extracted. Then the 
returns for each trading day were calculated, together with the returns for every trading day for 
each of the firms in the sample. 








The returns of the benchmark index are considered as the normal state of the returns. Since the 
industry specific indexes are comprised of firms active in the same sector, general trends in 
each industry should be captured to the largest extent possible 
As a first step, the initial returns were linearized. The linearized returns are defined as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒 = 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛) 
The linearized cumulative abnormal returns for a period was calculated the following way, by 
adding up the CAAR for each day during a specified time window: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑛 = ∑(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) 
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As shown in the formula above, to compute the CAARs for a specific period, the returns for the 
index are summed and then subtracted from the summed returns of the firm for the same period. 
This exercise was done for four time periods; the first trading day of the IPO, as well as the 
three-, six- and twelve months post-IPO. Following the work of several authors, for instance 
Rosen (2006) who also uses CAARs to measure stock market reactions to certain events, the 
rationale for using this measure as dependent variable seems self-evident. 
4.3 Independent variables 
The set of independent variables were chosen in order to measure how much of the variation in 
the dependent variable that can be measured from the independent ones.  
The financials were scaled by assets. This means that for sales, long-term debt, ebitda and so 
forth were divided by the firm’s assets according to the example below: 




This was done for each of the years for every firm in the dataset’s financials. Furthermore, for 
some financial items that were not suitable to scale by assets (for instance assets itself) the 
natural logarithm was applied instead to reduce the size of the numbers. Another example of 
this would be enterprise value Enterprise value takes the firm’s market capitalization (market 
value of equity) into account, as well as the net debt and is relatively close connected to assets. 
Hence, the natural logarithm was also applied to enterprise value. 
For the metrics price-to-book ratio, return on assets, debt-to-equity ratio and return on equity 
nothing was done as they already are expressed as a ratio. 
The main reason for selecting the chosen independent variables, was because they were 
believed to have an impact on ROA, without having too high correlation. Usually, this is 
described as multicollinearity, and occurs when the variables chosen as predictors have a strong 
correlation to the dependent variable. In the case of the regression where ROA serves as 
dependent variable, for example net income and total assets would have high correlation. 
When choosing independent variables, the number of observations for the data point must be 
taken into account since some metrics are not available before the point of the IPO. Moreover, 
some variables are closely related to each other and both of them should not be included in the 
regression model. Cash is a current asset and hence often included when computing the working 
capital, therefore only one of cash and NWC should be used. Capex is investments and 
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maintenance of fixed assets or tangible assets, such as property, plant and equipment. As a 
result, both of them should not be used in the models since there is usually a strong correlation 
between the amount of fixed assets a firm possesses and how much capital expenditure that is 






















5. Descriptive statistics 
In total, the sample consists of 126 IPOs between 2006 and 2017 on Nasdaq Stockholm. For 
the studied sample, most IPOs were registered in 2017, where the general trend is a significant 
increase in IPOs from 2014 and onwards. 
Table 2:  Summary of IPOs per year and by sector (PE-sponsored IPOs in parentheses) 
IPOs per year    IPOs per sector     
2006 3   Commodities 5 (0) 
2007 3 (1)  Data/IT 23 (4) 
2008 8   Industrial 25 (10) 
2009 6   Real Estate 10 (0) 
2010 10 (2)  Medical 20 (1) 
2011 10 (2)  Retail 7 (3) 
2012 3   Services 19 (10) 
2013 4   Food 2 (1) 
2014 15 (4)  Telecom 1 (0) 
2015 23 (10)  Fashion/Clothing 1 (0) 
2016 17 (6)  Finance 9 (2) 
2017 24 (8)  Energy 1 (0) 
    Travel 1 (0) 
    Education 1 (1) 
    Beauty/Health 1 (1) 
       
Note: The sample contains data from IPOs on Nasdaq Stockholm 
from 2006-2017. In total there were 126 IPOs out of which 33 had 
PE involvement. (PE-sponsored IPOs in parentheses) 
 
When looking at the specific industries, industrial companies dominated with 25 IPOs during 
the studied time period. The industrials sector recorded the most IPOs accounting for 25 out of 
the 126 IPOs.  The industrial sector was closely followed by the data and information 
technology industry where 23 IPOs were registered. 
Out of the total 126 IPOs in the sample, 33 had PE involvement. Among the PE-backed IPOs 
there were two dominating sectors; “industrial” and “services”, which both accounted for ten 







Table 3: Summary statistics for Non-backed firms 
  IPO -1 year    Year of IPO    IPO +1 year  
 Obs Mean Median 
St. 
Dev.  Obs Mean Median 
St. 
Dev.  Obs Mean Median 
St. 
Dev. 
sales/assets 91 1.0434 0.9734 0.8383  93 0.9978 0.9208 0.8117  93 1.0198 0.9069 0.8336 
ln(total assets) 92 13.5528 13.4996 1.7206  93 13.8404 13.9226 1.6506  93 14.0004 14.0542 1.6074 
long-term debt/assets 91 0.1550 0.0656 0.2077  93 0.1351 0.0523 0.1735  92 0.1267 0.0477 0.1638 
ebitda/assets 87 0.0610 0.0988 0.3271  90 0.0765 0.1078 0.2092  93 0.0752 0.1022 0.2113 
cash/assets 67 0.1618 0.0800 0.2154  73 0.2027 0.1158 0.2302  77 0.1938 0.1026 0.2204 
               
ln(enterprise value) 45 13.5634 13.4913 1.2585  86 14.1367 13.8441 1.5942  91 14.2875 14.3910 1.6042 
price-to-book 48 2.9156 2.1450 2.9795  52 3.4496 2.1250 3.9971  93 2.9708 1.9300 3.0708 
working capital/assets 90 0.1850 0.1766 0.2654  91 0.2314 0.1976 0.2486  91 0.2028 0.1522 0.2663 
ppe/assets 92 0.1784 0.0451 0.2637  93 0.1723 0.0471 0.2544  93 0.1760 0.0523 0.2592 
               
capex/assets 91 0.0530 0.0193 0.1106  92 0.0448 0.0195 0.0749  93 0.0393 0.0154 0.0565 
return on assets 91 0.0074 0.0338 0.3128  93 0.0273 0.0466 0.1852  93 0.0169 0.0584 0.2025 
debt-to-equity 88 1.5048 0.4418 4.5453  92 0.7036 0.2621 1.6155  89 0.5902 0.2648 0.8595 
return on equity 91 -0.2806 0.1144 4.9298   93 0.0848 0.1316 0.2632   93 0.0437 0.1243 0.4895 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics for PE-backed firms 
  IPO -1 year    Year of IPO    IPO +1 year  
 Obs Mean Median 
St. 
Dev.  Obs Mean Median 
St. 
Dev.  Obs Mean Median 
St. 
Dev. 
sales/assets 32 0.9507 0.9771 0.4868  33 1.0170 1.0592 0.4855  33 1.0351 1.0304 0.4975 
ln(total assets) 32 14.8948 15.0337 1.4761  33 15.0278 15.0068 1.2372  33 15.1083 14.9905 1.2122 
long-term debt/assets 32 0.3378 0.3578 0.1904  33 0.2364 0.2375 0.1160  33 0.2210 0.2366 0.1230 
ebitda/assets 32 0.0271 0.0901 0.3830  33 0.0854 0.0926 0.1190  33 0.0784 0.1034 0.1917 
cash/assets 32 0.1084 0.0586 0.1429  33 0.1021 0.0504 0.1596  32 0.0997 0.0650 0.1591 
               
ln(enterprise value) 1 12.7513 12.7513 0.0000  31 15.3159 15.2735 0.9974  33 15.2956 15.5008 1.0531 
price-to-book 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  3 1.6433 0.0000 2.8463  33 2.5194 2.2300 1.9379 
working capital/assets 32 0.0804 0.0308 0.1679  33 0.1041 0.0678 0.2177  33 0.0993 0.0606 0.2014 
ppe/assets 32 0.0806 0.0630 0.0750  33 0.0868 0.0766 0.0745  33 0.0872 0.0747 0.0780 
               
capex/assets 31 0.0173 0.0139 0.0136  33 0.0260 0.0149 0.0259  33 0.0200 0.0158 0.0176 
return on assets 32 -0.0341 0.0204 0.3715  33 0.0286 0.0399 0.1047  33 0.0277 0.0574 0.1797 
debt-to-equity 32 2.2685 1.3144 4.1175  33 0.6617 0.6403 0.3550  33 0.6436 0.6841 0.3620 
return on equity 32 -0.0419 0.0979 0.7963   33 0.0796 0.0914 0.1396   33 0.0806 0.1345 0.2691 
               
Note: In this table, each financial item or ratio corresponds to the year stated in the header, and no lag for ROA was used. 
 
When looking at the mean and medians for the two different IPO groups for each of the three 
years used to form the dataset, some conclusions can be made for these companies during the 
20 
 
studied years. The table above shows whether PE- or non-backed firms had the highest mean 
and median for the respective financial item or ratio. By looking at the table above, it should 
give a general idea of the distribution of the data between the two different groups, during the 
specific time period and for this particular sample. 
When looking at the mean for the year prior to the IPO, the non-backed firms had higher sales 
to assets, on average. However, while moving forward to the year of the IPO and one year post-
IPO the PE-backed firms showed higher sales in relation to assets which was consistent with 
the medians of the sample as well. 
Both the means and medians, when looking at the logarithmized assets, where higher for the 
PE-backed firms. The same holds for the long-term debt/assets.  
For ebitda to assets, the pattern follows the one of sales, where the non-backed firms showed a 
higher ebitda in relation to assets prior to the IPO. Later, the PE-backed firms surpassed the 
non-backed firms for the year of the IPO and post-IPO. 
In terms of cash, the non-backed firms showed higher cash/assets consistently through the 
sample. 
Enterprise value had few observations for the year prior to the IPO. Especially when looking at 
the PE-backed firms. Considering the year post-IPO, the PE-backed firms had higher enterprise 
values, on average. This implies that the PE-backed firms are larger, which goes in line with 
PE-firms having more assets as well. 
Regarding price-to-book ratio, there were only a full set of observations for the year post-IPO. 
Hence, the only conclusion to be made is that for these firms, non-backed firms had a higher 
price-to-book ratio on average. If a stock is trading at a P/B value below 1, it might imply that 
the stock is undervalued. In this case, both of the means for the two different groups are above 
2.5. 
Working capital and cash are somewhat related due to the fact that cash is considered a quick 
current asset. As in the case with cash, the non-backed firms showed the higher working capital 
to assets ratio for all the periods. 
In a similar way capex and PPE are related due to the fact that capex is investments and 
maintenance of a firm’s fixed assets. By looking at the means, one can tell that this relationship 
holds for the given sample, as the non-backed firms display both higher capex- and PPE in 
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relation to assets for all the periods. However, the mean and median for PPE differs quite a bit 
since the PE-backed firms have higher medians. 
Return on assets is, on average, higher for the non-backed firms the year before the IPO. 
However, this changes for the year of the IPO and the year post-IPO, where the PE group shows 
higher ROA on average. 
The PE-group on average had a higher debt-to-equity ratio both prior to, and post-IPO. Return 
on assets follows the same pattern, which seems reasonable since higher leverage could be 
utilized in order to achieve higher profit. 
Table 5: PE-backed and Non-backed CAARs for different time windows post-IPO 
Non-backed CAARs 
       
Variable Obs Mean Median St. Dev. Max Min 
first trading day 93 -0.0054 -0.0061 0.0364 0.1091 -0.1309 
three months 92 -0.0665 -0.0617 0.1972 0.6739 -0.5217 
six months 92 -0.0758 -0.0543 0.3304 0.8168 -0.8622 
twelve months 92 -0.0878 -0.0706 0.5407 1.5057 -2.2178 
 
PE-backed CAARs 
       
Variable Obs Mean Median St. Dev. Max Min 
first trading day 33 -0.0067 -0.0078 0.0271 0.0449 -0.0944 
three months 33 0.0448 0.0433 0.1134 0.3365 -0.2467 
six months 33 0.0543 0.0477 0.1884 0.5043 -0.2697 
twelve months 33 0.0676 0.0481 0.2792 0.6492 -0.3777 
 
The means and medians of the CAARs inside of the two different IPO groups are relatively 
close to each other for the four different time periods. The first trading day’s CAARs are 
negative for both of the groups, with the PE-backed showing a larger decline in stock prices the 
first day following the IPO. 
The three months’ cumulative abnormal returns are negative for the non-backed, and positive 
for the PE-backed group, on average. The six month’s CAARs is on average higher than the 
three month’s for the PE-backed group, but the same relationship does not hold for the non-
backed fims, where the CAARs are even more negative for the six-month period.  
Twelve months CAARs are positive for the PE-backed group, where non-backed firms 




The regression below predicts next year’s return on assets based on sales, debt-to-equity ratio, 
ebitda and property, plant and equipment scaled by assets, while controlling for PE-sponsor 
backing. Three different versions of the regression are presented. The year fixed effects 
regression was the one which showed most explanatory power. Hence, it will be the focus of 
the analysis in the results section for the regression using ROA as dependent variable.  
Table 6: Regression using ROA as dependent variable 
    Year fixed effects Industry fixed effects 
Variables Return on assets+1 year Return on assets+1 year Return on assets+1 year 
        
sales/assets 0.0569*** 0.0476*** 0.0586** 
 (0.0150) (0.0169) (0.0280) 
debt-to-equity ratio -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0005 
 (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0038) 
ebitda/assets 0.2954*** 0.2988** 0.2465 
 (0.0389) (0.1437) (0.2201) 
ppe/assets 0.0800 0.0782* 0.0290 
 (0.0512) (0.0470) (0.0704) 
pe-sponsor dummy 0.0201 0.0230* -0.0021 
 (0.0232) (0.0120) (0.0344) 
Constant -0.0715*** -0.0624** -0.0570 
 (0.0223) (0.0289) (0.0402) 
    
Observations 238 238 238 
R-squared 0.3069 0.3329 0.3491 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
    
Note: Due to the relatively small sample, a bootstrap regression with 1,000 repetitions was run for 
the regression with year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. 
 
Looking at sales/assets, it is significant on the one percent level. Sales is the highest line item 
on a profit and loss statement (P&L), from which costs are subtracted to finally reach net income 
as bottom line. Since return on assets is defined as net income/total assets, it is natural that an 
increase in sales would have a positive impact on return on assets. A one percentage point 
increase in sales (scaled by assets) would, on average, increase the return on next year’s ROA 
by 0.0476 percentage points, all else held constant. 
The debt-to-equity ratio shows a small negative relationship to ROA for all three regressions in 
the table above. One interpretation could be that high leverage leads to more cost for interest 
payments which reduces the net income. On the other hand, higher leverage could mean that 
the company has borrowed cash for investments opportunities, which are supposed to generate 
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profits which would increase net income. Either way, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant on any level and hence no certain conclusions can be made. 
EBITDA/assets is significant at the five percent level with a positive coefficient. By removing 
taxes, interest payments, depreciation and amortization you arrive at the net income. Therefore, 
companies with a higher EBITDA, which often serves as a proxy for free cash flow, in general 
should have a higher net income. However, it depends on a lot of other factors as well. Keeping 
in mind that EBITDA is scaled by assets, a company that have higher EBITDA in relation to 
its assets, probably have higher free cash flow as well. This gives more financial flexibility with 
opportunities to use the free cash to further increase returns. On average, if EBITDA scaled by 
assets increases by one percentage point, ROA would increase by 0.2988 percentage points as 
well if all else is held constant. 
When looking at sales and EBITDA on a scaled by assets basis, the difference is that high sales 
in relation to assets not necessarily would mean better return on assets. It all depends on the 
margins of the specific firm. This is evident when looking at the coefficients, where 
ebitda/assets has a much larger impact on ROA than sales/assets. 
Property, plant and equipment (PPE) displays a positive coefficient significant at the ten percent 
level. PPE are the company’s fixed assets, and the amount of PPE usually has a strong 
relationship to how much capex a company spends in order to invest, or maintain the fixed 
assets. The sector a company operates in usually have impact on how much fixed assets that are 
needed. For instance, a consulting firm or software company does not need as much fixed assets 
as a producing industrial firm. Here PPE represents the amount of PPE in relation to total assets. 
The interpretation from the regression output could be that a firm with high amount of PPE 
could be used to further increase ROA. Comparing two identical firms except one having higher 
PPE would probably mean that the firm has newer, more or better means for production and 
therefore higher capacity. For the other regressions, no statistical significance was found for the 
PPE/total assets variable. But on average a one percentage point increase in PPE scaled by 
assets increases ROA by 0.0782 percentage points. Moreover, PPE are depreciated over the 
course of several years, and capex might not be needed yearly to maintain these assets. 
Therefore, a firm might enjoy the benefits of having a lot of PPE while the future need for capex 
to maintain it is not reflected in the ROA at the time. 
The PE-sponsor dummy variable takes on the value 1 for PE-backed firms that went through 
an IPO, and 0 for the non-backed. This is probably the most interesting coefficient to study in 
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the regression output. It is significant at the ten percent level, with a positive coefficient of 
0.0230. This translates to that next year’s ROA is on average 2.3 percentage points higher than 
non-backed firms, all else held constant. The PE-sponsor dummy variable was only significant 
for the regression taking the time fixed effects into consideration.  
As seen in the regression table with next year’s return on assets as dependent variable, the 
coefficients almost entirely take on the same signs in spite of not always showing significance. 
This is possibly a result of de number of observations not being that many. Because of the data 
sample not being that large, a bootstrap regression was run with 1,000 repetitions, for the year 
fixed effects model and the industry fixed model, as explained in Table 6. 
Next, the effect on cumulative abnormal returns will be assessed due to the effect of private 
equity-backing. Four different time windows have been studied. The different time windows 
corresponding to each CAAR is measured from the point of a firm going public in Table 7. 
Table 7: Regression using CAAR as dependent variable, year fixed effects 
Year fixed effects CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR 
Variables First day Three months Six months Twelve months 
          
sales/assets -0.0005 0.0641** 0.0111 0.0569 
 (0.0059) (0.0267) (0.0446) (0.0706) 
cash/assets -0.0019 0.0712 0.1640 0.6727*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0862) (0.1438) (0.2277) 
capex/assets -0.0770 -0.5398** -0.6927 -0.0081 
 (0.0590) (0.2698) (0.4500) (0.7126) 
roe 0.0047 0.1847** 0.5169*** 0.6915*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0778) (0.1297) (0.2054) 
pe-sponsor dummy -0.0004 0.1012*** 0.0807 0.1242 
 (0.0082) (0.0377) (0.0629) (0.0996) 
Constant -0.0026 -0.1256*** -0.0865 -0.2670** 
 (0.0092) (0.0421) (0.0701) (0.1111) 
     
Observations 105 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.1383 0.3344 0.3273 0.3020 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
    
Note: The time period for each CAAR corresponds to time from the IPO. 
 
For the regressions using CAAR as the dependent variable with time fixed effects, the three-
month period is the only one where the effect of private equity firm involvement is validated 
with statistical significance being shown for the PE-sponsor dummy variable. This period is the 
one were conclusions can be made regarding the private equity effect. Therefore, the three-
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month CAARs will be the main subject of analysis for this regression. For the three-month 
period post-IPO, the results show statistical significance for all variables but one. Sales is 
significant at the five percent level with a positive coefficient. Higher sales in relation to the 
firm’s asset increases the firm’s performance in a three-month window after the firm going 
public. It seems natural that firms with higher sales (scaled by assets) should be appreciated by 
investors. Larger firms, in terms of sales, should have better bargaining power and better reach. 
If a firm experienced a one percentage point increase in sales scaled by assets, an average 
increase of 0.0641 percentage points would be seen in ROA, all else held constant. 
Cash/assets shows a positive coefficient for all periods except the first day CAARs. The fact 
that cash has a positive coefficient is not surprising, since firms with higher liquidity can act 
faster to both unforeseen events and allocate resources where it is needed to achieve the sought 
after results. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant and no certain conclusions 
can be drawn. 
Capex/assets is statistically significant at the five percent level. Firms having a lot of capital 
expenditure are likely to experience less cumulative abnormal returns the following three 
months of an initial public offering. It is not surprising since investments in fixed assets are not 
likely to yield results instantly. Those are the conclusions from the negative coefficient that 
capex shows. Private equity funds prefer firms with little requirements on capital expenditure 
in order to operate, since it reduces the free cash flow which often is required to service interest 
payments due to a high portion of debt financing. Moreover, the cash flows are to a high degree 
used in order to pay down the debt in order to increase the amount of returns at the point of exit. 
A one percentage point increase in capex/total assets, on average, results in a -0.5398 
percentage point reduction of ROA keeping everything else constant. Capex/assets shows a 
constant which have a particularly large, and negative, impact on ROA. Since stock prices, 
which is one of the two components to compute CAARs, reflects all available information about 
a company one could argue that it is natural investors put weight into high capex. As previously 
said, capex reduces the free cash flow, and reduces the amount of earnings that could be paid 
out to shareholders as dividends and correspondingly would give a lower output when valuing 
the firm. 
Return on equity is a financial performance measure and says something about how efficiently 
the firm utilizes part of its assets to create profit, since total assets less total liabilities equals 
shareholders’ equity. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the five percent 
level. Return on equity is defined as net income divided by shareholders’ equity. A higher return 
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on equity is highly appreciated, as it is a financial metric to look at in order to assess the 
financial soundness of a given firm. Moreover, it means that there is a greater likelihood to be 
any earnings left for the equity holders, after debt payments have been made. The relationship 
between ROE and CAARs for the three months’ period is that a one percentage increase in 
ROE, would lead to an average increase of 0.1847 percentage points in CAARs for the three-
month period, when keeping everything else constant. 
While looking at the PE-sponsor dummy, the coefficient is positive. On average, the PE-backed 
firms that went through an IPO had three month CAARs of 10.12 percentage points higher than 
non-backed firms, all else kept equal. For the studied years and the selected sample, this is 
statistically significant at the one percent level. 
Table 8: Regression using CAAR as dependent variable, industry fixed effects 
Industry fixed effects CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR 
Variables First day Three months Six months Twelve months 
          
sales/assets 0.0010 0.0660* 0.0062 0.0544 
 (0.0076) (0.0352) (0.0595) (0.0958) 
cash/assets 0.0056 0.1098 0.2913* 0.7847*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0969) (0.1639) (0.2639) 
capex/assets -0.0734 -0.4878* -0.7431 0.1746 
 (0.0628) (0.2913) (0.4926) (0.7930) 
roe 0.0008 0.1575* 0.4486*** 0.7338*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0861) (0.1456) (0.2344) 
pe-sponsor dummy -0.0028 0.0971** 0.0831 0.1578 
 (0.0092) (0.0427) (0.0723) (0.1163) 
Constant -0.0045 -0.1328** -0.0974 -0.3046** 
 (0.0113) (0.0523) (0.0885) (0.1424) 
     
Observations 105 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.1327 0.2995 0.2722 0.2196 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
    
Note: The time period for each CAAR corresponds to time from the IPO. 
 
As seen in the table above, the results when taking the industry fixed effects into consideration, 
are much similar to the ones while using year fixed effects. One notable difference is that 
cash/assets have the largest impact on CAARs for the twelve months’ period. The takeaway 
would be that cash can be used to achieve greater CAARs in the longer-run, since the results 
from the possible investments that a pool of cash enables, are not seen immediately. 
27 
 
The fact that the results were more complete, in terms of more variables showing statistical 
significance while using time fixed effects regressions is reasonable. To begin with, the 
financial items are scaled by each firm’s assets and ratios are firm specific by default, which 
makes all firms more comparable, regardless of industry. Moreover, for the CAARs, industry 
specific indexes were used which makes the excess returns more comparable across industries. 
In other words, the sector specific gains and losses are smoothened out. However, the time fixed 
effects are not being taken into account any other way. Therefore, the time fixed effects 
regressions were the main subject for discussion in this analysis. 
Just as in the regression using next year’s return on assets as dependent variable, the coefficients 
while regressing CAARs are quite aligned in terms of signs, with regards to the variables for 
three months, six months and twelve months CAARs. It is mostly the first day cumulative 
abnormal returns that show deviant values. Since the goal was to study the effect of PE-
sponsored IPOs in the short-term with regards to cumulative abnormal returns, the first day 
CAARs are not that representative. This has to do with the IPO underpricing phenomenon, and 
the first day returns not being representable for the performance for several months following 
the IPO. 
For the three months, six months and twelve months CAARs, the PE-sponsor dummy variable 
all have positive signs, in spite of only being significant for the three-month period. This could 
however be a result of IPO signaling, where Private Equity firms who possesses significant 
know-how on how to take firms public, purposely underprice their IPOs in order to achieve a 
successful IPO in terms of initial returns. In the future, investors are then more likely see the 
PE-backed IPOs as firms of higher quality. This could be classified as a problem of 
asymmetrical information. 
A regression while using CAAR as dependent variable without controlling for industry- or year 
fixed effects can be found in Appendix Table 1, where the results are very similar to the ones 









This study investigates the effect private equity firms have on companies that go through an 
initial public offering, both in terms of return on assets and cumulative abnormal returns. The 
paper aims to answer whether or not private equity-backed firms are performing better in the 
short-term after going through the event of an initial public offering.  
Jensen (1986, 1989), claims that the formula for successful private equity investments includes 
the increased operational efficiencies, increased leverage, managerial proficiency and close 
monitoring. Managerial proficiency and monitoring was not studied in this paper. However, it 
is not uncommon for private equity firms to put new management into place when acquiring a 
company. Of course the management is selected so that the PE-owner can have a close dialogue 
with management and implement their strategies. The findings of this paper is more in line with 
the findings of Cao & Lerner (2009), who found that there is a weak correlation between 
correlation between high leverage and performance post-IPO, as the effect of debt-to-equity 
ratio on ROA was not statistically significant. However, PE-backed firms that went through an 
IPO displayed both higher return on assets, and higher CAARs for the three-month period post-
IPO during the studied period. It seems natural that the results for ROA and CAARs are aligned, 
since higher ROA should imply better overall performance which should be reflected in stock 
prices as well. 
Ritter (1991) discusses the work of Ibbotson, Sindelar & Ritter (1988) which studies the first-
day returns and found that the initial return was estimated to 16.4%. His notion is that investors 
periodically are over optimistic about firms’ growth prospects. In contrast to these authors, the 
descriptive statistics for the selected sample shows negative first-day returns for both non-
backed and PE-backed IPOs. However, the regression output first day CAARs could not be 
confirmed as statistically significant. 
For the second regression using CAARs as the dependent variable, it could be concluded that 
PE-backed firms on average experienced higher CAARs of 10.12 percentage points than non-
backed firms, all else held constant, during the three-month period following the initial public 
offering. This seems in line while comparing the regression result to the descriptive statistics 
of CAARs in Table 5, where the private equity-backed firms on average displayed CAARs of 
4.48 percent, in comparison to the non-backed of -6.65 percent for the three-months period, as 
the difference is roughly 11 percent. One could argue that is expected, since private equity funds 
have a more direct incentive to seek higher increases in stock prices in the short-term post-IPO. 
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This is a result of the stock price being directly linked to how high the internal rate of return 
will be for a private equity fund in the case of exit through an IPO, and because of lock-up 
periods prohibiting the owners to sell all of their stock immediately. Therefore, private equity 
owners should be very focused on stock price development in the year following the IPO, since 
they are close to the point of exit and can aim to drive up returns, whereas a company without 
any financial sponsor is much more long-term focused. This is also reflected while looking at 
the twelve-months CAARs in the descriptive statistics, Table 5, where PE-backed firms showed 
the largest values and, non-backed the largest negative values. 
Like the results of Levis (2011), there seems evident that PE funds active in the Nordics who 
listed companies on Nasdaq Stockholm, were primarily focused on certain industries. These 
were companies in the “Services” sectors like Levis also concluded in his work. For this study, 
“Industrial” companies also stand out as one of the most common sectors for PE-backed IPOs 
on Nasdaq Stockholm between 2006 and 2017. 
Regarding the regression using next year’s return on assets as dependent variable, we can 
conclude the private equity-backed firms on average experience a 2.3 percentage points higher 
ROA for next year, than non-backed firms. 
If one were to accept IPOs as being a suitable method for measuring the “PE-effect” on firm’s 
performance, this study concludes that PE-sponsored IPOs are performing better in terms of 
next year’s ROA. Moreover, PE-backed firms outperform non-backed counterparts with 
regards to cumulative abnormal returns during the three months following the IPO. No findings 
can be concluded for the other time windows of the CAARs due to lack of statistical 
significance. PE-sponsors seems to be capable of achieving their goals by spurring management 
through close monitoring and incentive programs. Furthermore, as previously stated, if several 
individuals are heavily rewarded personally for achieving financial goals, it often happens. 
7.1 Further research 
In future research, it would be interesting to correct the shortcoming of this paper with the 
relatively small data sample. To solve this issue, one could include additional firms from 
smaller lists than Nasdaq Stockholm. In addition to this, it would be interesting to conduct the 
same analysis on other markets, and perhaps comparing Nordic countries to each other. 
Moreover, quarterly data can be studied instead of yearly, in order to get better understanding 
of how the state of the firms developed around the event of the IPO with higher precision.  
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Furthermore, instead of using available benchmark indexes to compute CAARs, synthetic 
indexes could be created. With more resources, firms could be manually selected with the best 
matching characteristics to each firm in the sample. The industry specific indexes are generally 
a good fit, but it can be further improved. 
The time windows for the cumulative abnormal returns can be expanded in future research, to 
assess the effects private equity funds have on their sponsored IPOs in the long-run, as in over 
one year. 
Lastly, the results bring some thought to reflections about IPO underpricing. A future study 
could continue on the topic of underpricing, and look at the stock prices closer to the event of 
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Appendix 1: Regression using CAAR as dependent variable 
   CAAR CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  
Variables First day Three months Six months Twelve months 
          
sales/assets -0.0023 0.0526** 0.0022 0.0430 
 (0.0057) (0.0263) (0.0441) (0.0698) 
cash/assets -0.0059 0.0558 0.1913 0.6792*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0854) (0.1434) (0.2269) 
capex/assets -0.0572 -0.4571* -0.8082* -0.1523 
 (0.0567) (0.2626) (0.4408) (0.6974) 
roe -0.0021 0.1824** 0.5231*** 0.7231*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0763) (0.1280) (0.2026) 
pe-sponsor dummy -0.0024 0.0959*** 0.0950 0.1653* 
 (0.0079) (0.0364) (0.0611) (0.0967) 
Constant 0.0002 -0.1130*** -0.0831 -0.2643** 
 (0.0090) (0.0416) (0.0699) (0.1106) 
     
Observations 105 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.0117 0.2168 0.1986 0.1698 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
    
Note: The time period for each CAAR corresponds to time from the IPO. 
 
